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MARRIAGE EQUALITY AND MARITAL SUPREMACY 
SERENE MAYERI 
Katherine Franke’s Wedlocked: The Perils of Marriage Equality is the 
culmination of almost two decades of trenchant scholarship challenging the 
primacy of marriage in LGBT advocacy and in American law and society. Since 
the late 1990s, Franke has mined the history of African Americans’ postbellum 
encounters with marriage for cautionary tales about the hazards of legal 
recognition. In both contexts, Franke argues, winning marriage rights risks 
exposed individuals and families to invasive regulation, stifling sexual freedom 
and experimentation, suppressing alternative arrangements for the provision of 
care and support, and demeaning those who cannot or do not wish to marry.1 
The parallel between Reconstruction-era freedpeople and twenty-first century 
gay and lesbian Americans, as Franke is careful to acknowledge, is imperfect; it 
is discontinuity as much as similarity that makes the analogy fruitful. Most 
strikingly, the juxtaposition of these two cases spotlights how marriage equality 
advocates have succeeded, with astonishing alacrity, in normalizing what was 
once unthinkable. Franke argues that the marriage equality movement achieved 
this feat in part by inadvertently mobilizing the very ideological tropes and 
material realities that have rendered marriage at best an elusive ideal and at worst 
a rationale for the oppression and marginalization of African Americans. 
Why have these encounters with marriage diverged so profoundly, defying 
Franke’s earlier concern that gay marriage rights might aggravate rather than 
ameliorate homophobia? During Reconstruction, recognizing freedpeople as 
equal citizens with full ownership of their bodies and labor, with legal rights to 
marry and form families without interference from white overlords, posed a 
profound threat to the very foundation of white Southern society, labor relations, 
and political economy. Put simply, powerful white Southerners had everything 
to lose from recognizing the rights of freedpeople. The horrific backlash against 
marriage rights was part of a larger violent repression that squelched the promise 
of emancipation and largely reinstated a system that exploited African 
Americans’ labor under conditions of excruciating unfreedom. 
Today, most white Americans probably do not see basic legal rights for 
African Americans as a profound threat to their own status and well-being. (And 
indeed formal legal equality has proven to be a less-than-powerful weapon 
against entrenched racial privilege and injustice). Yet, as Franke describes, 
African Americans are perceived as, and blamed for, deviating from the 
 
 Professor of Law and History, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
1 KATHERINE FRANKE, WEDLOCKED: THE PERILS OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY (2015). 
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normative ideal of family life. Specifically, bearing and raising children outside 
of marriage threatens a system that privatizes dependency in the nuclear family. 
Promoters of marriage as a solution to poverty seek to avoid the larger public 
outlays required to provide financial and/or caregiving support to single parents. 
In contrast, equal rights for gay and lesbian couples appear to pose little 
material threat, real or perceived, to the political economy of marriage in the 
United States. While some straight Americans see in same-sex marriage an 
existential threat, marriage equality for gay and lesbian couples—and even 
enforceable laws against discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender 
identity more broadly—would not fundamentally alter the regional or national 
balance of social, political, and economic power. And (as Franke notes), at least 
some public officials perceive gay and lesbian (adoptive) parents as offering a 
“solution” to the “problem” of unplanned pregnancy, a problem which gay and 
lesbian parents themselves are assumed not to experience.2 In other words, one 
explanation for the relative impotence of the anti-marriage equality backlash 
might be that same-sex marriage (and nondiscrimination based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity) does not appear to threaten entrenched power 
structures or pocketbooks. 
Franke’s transhistorical comparison also invites us to consider how the social 
meaning and material reality of marriage has changed in the century and a half 
between Reconstruction and the triumph of marriage equality. Since formerly 
enslaved persons gained access to the institution in the nineteenth century, 
marriage has undergone several intertwined and overlapping transformations. 
Relevant changes concern, for instance: the internal architecture of marriage 
(private inter se rights and obligations of spouses to each other); the relationship 
between marriage and the state (the public benefits and duties conferred by the 
government on marital families); the boundaries between marriage and 
nonmarriage (how the laws of marriage and marital status affect the 
nonmarried); the social norms and practices surrounding marriage and 
nonmarriage (including demographic shifts in who marries, divorces, cohabits, 
gives birth, performs parenting functions); and of course the larger political, 
economic, and social context. 
The nineteenth-century marital bargain retained much of the formal structure 
of coverture, with husbands and wives expected to perform distinct reciprocal 
roles. Wives owed husbands personal services including maintaining a home, 
caring for children and other dependents, and sexual access. In exchange, 
husbands bore primary responsibility for the family’s financial support. By the 
middle of the twentieth century, the marital bargain acquired a greater public 
component. For many women, marriage to a male breadwinner became the 
primary gateway to benefits such as Social Security and health insurance.3 
 
2 Id. at 186. 
3 See NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2000); 
ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR 
ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP (1998). 
  
2016] MARRIAGE EQUALITY AND MARITAL SUPREMACY 21 
 
“Deserving” widows, abandoned mothers, and their children could receive 
public assistance through mothers’ pensions and later Aid to (Families with) 
Dependent Children. But social insurance remained out of reach for the many 
African American women and men who worked in domestic and agricultural 
occupations.4 De jure and de facto segregation in education, housing, and 
employment limited access to desirable jobs and neighborhoods. As black 
women and children gained access to welfare benefits, they became increasingly 
stingy and stigmatized.5 Many African Americans, in short, never enjoyed the 
benefits of the old gender-based marital bargain. 
A second transformation of marriage has occurred in the years since the 1965 
Moynihan Report crystalized the political linkage of family structure and 
poverty. Feminists—led by African American advocates such as Pauli Murray 
and Eleanor Holmes Norton—promoted an egalitarian vision of marriage in 
which men and women shared breadwinning and caregiving responsibilities. 
This egalitarian vision underwrote Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s 1970s litigation 
campaign, which turned husbands and wives into interchangeable spouses as a 
matter of formal law. By the end of the 1970s, marriage had become essentially 
gender-neutral as a matter of constitutional law: the government could no longer 
award benefits based on stereotypical assumptions of wives’ dependence upon 
breadwinning husbands. Under the new marital bargain, educated professional 
women gained the opportunity—in theory, at least—to forge equal partnerships 
with men. Increasingly, however, marriage—egalitarian or otherwise—
remained out of reach for many low-income women and women of color. Rates 
of divorce and nonmarital childbearing soared. Just as feminists renegotiated the 
marital bargain, marriage itself became a status of the privileged.6 
Notwithstanding these profound changes, marriage’s legal supremacy 
endured. Constitutional challenges succeeded in removing many of the formal 
legal disabilities endured by nonmarital children, but the government remained 
free to privilege and promote marriage at the expense of nonmarital families.7 
As the marriage equality movement exposed and emphasized, by the turn of the 
twenty-first century myriad federal and state laws conferred rights and 
obligations on the basis of marital status. And for all of the ways that twenty-
first century marriage might be unrecognizable to a nineteenth-century 
American, certain constants remain. Marriage continues to be a primary means 
 
4 See LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF 
WELFARE, 1890-1935 (1994); JENNIFER MITTELSTADT, FROM WELFARE TO WORKFARE: THE 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF LIBERAL REFORM, 1945-1965 (2005). 
5 See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE 
MEANING OF LIBERTY, chp. 5 (1996). 
6 SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION (2011); Serena Mayeri, Marriage (In)equality and the Historical Legacies of 
Feminism, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 126 (2015). 
7 Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the Constitution of the Nonmarital Family, 103 
CALIF. L. REV. 1277 (2015). 
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of managing dependency in the absence of a robust welfare state. The more 
marriage correlates with socioeconomic status, the more the material and 
dignitary benefits of marriage accrue to those who need them least, exacerbating 
a vicious cycle of inequality. 
This interim history can help shed light on the questions motivating Franke’s 
study of marriage equality’s perils, and the conclusions we might draw from her 
book. Chapter 6 asks, provocatively, is marriage “for straight people?”8 Franke 
suggests that marriage may be a poor fit for individuals and couples who wish 
to depart from traditional heteronormative gender roles.9 Arguably, though, 
marriage today is working best for couples who conform to the ideal of shared 
breadwinning and caregiving pioneered by African American feminists; many 
spouses who specialize in caregiving still find themselves disadvantaged at 
divorce. If this is true, then to the extent that married same-sex couples are more 
likely to have egalitarian relationships, divorce laws that assume equal 
contributions to the accumulation of marital property and limit long-term 
spousal support may be a reasonably good fit (or at least no worse than for 
different-sex couples). Same-sex couples (like different-sex couples) who wish 
to keep their property separate, and limit post-dissolution obligations, can opt 
out through premarital agreements. 
The disciplining effect of marriage seems potentially more troubling, but 
there is another side to this story, too. As Mary Anne Case has written, marriage 
today may paradoxically confer greater “license” for couples to structure their 
relationships, including their sexual lives, as they choose without interference 
from the state.10 And as feminist and family law scholars have long observed, it 
is nonmarital, dissolving, and impoverished families who experience intrusions 
into family life that marital privacy would never countenance. 
Marriage, in other words, may be a good fit for gay and lesbian couples who 
look and act like the subset of privileged straight couples for whom marriage is 
working best. But regardless of one’s predictions about how marriage will affect 
and be affected by the same-sex couples who choose to marry, the threat to the 
non-married (gay and straight) that Franke identifies seems undeniable. That 
threat, I would suggest, is posed not so much by marriage equality as by marriage 
supremacy—the legal and social privileging of marriage and marital families. 
So long as public and private benefits such as social insurance and health care 
are tied to marriage (or to conjugal partnership) and inaccessible to the 
nonmarried and unpartnered, marriage will continue to be an engine of 
inequality. So long as parental rights and obligations depend upon marital status, 
nonmarital parents and children will suffer disadvantage. So long as marriage is 
considered the gold standard of relationships, alternatives to marriage (and to 
conjugal partnership) languish, stifling and marginalizing not only marriage 
dissenters but those for whom marriage is desired but inaccessible. 
 
8 FRANKE, supra note 1, at 208. 
9 Id. at 207-32. 
10 Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758 (2005). 
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The history of challenges to the legal primacy of marriage is a tale both 
cautionary and inspiring for those who share Franke’s vision of a world in which 
marriage ceases to be central to social and economic citizenship. At the same 
time that feminists succeeded in making the laws of marriage and divorce 
formally gender-neutral, another, lesser-known, and less successful strand of 
feminism attacked laws that penalized unmarried women and their families. 
African Americans often led the way in these challenges to laws that excluded 
women with nonmarital children from employment and housing, denied them 
government benefits, forced mothers to identify their children’s father, and 
discriminated against “illegitimate” children in matters of support, inheritance, 
government benefits, and the like. The campaign against illegitimacy penalties 
was most successful when it could frame innocent children as the primary 
victims of policies meant to deter adults’ illicit sexual relationships, and when 
eliminating discrimination furthered the privatization of dependency. It was far 
less successful in persuading courts to question the supremacy of marriage, to 
endorse unfettered sexual and reproductive liberty, or to see discrimination 
based on marital status as unjustly perpetuating racial, sexual, and economic 
inequality.11 
Wedlocked closes with a “Progressive Call to Action for Married Queers” in 
which Franke exhorts newly rights-bearing spouses to support alternatives to 
marriage; to resist the denigration of nonmarital relationships, sexuality, and 
reproduction; and to fight for other progressive causes such as racial and 
economic justice and reproductive rights.12 Whether same-sex marriage marks 
the latest chapter in the history of marital supremacy or the first step toward 
achieving a broader vision of equality depends on all of us—married, queer, or 
neither—to heed her call. 
 
11 For more, see Mayeri, supra note 7. 
12 FRANKE, supra note 1, at 233-35. 
